The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ____ (), Immanent realism: an introduction to Brentano. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth. Intencionalidad y verdad en el juicio: Una propuesta de Brentano (Publicaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Navarra. Colección.
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Against this proposal, Millikan has argued that the information carried by a sign depends on its causes, not its effects.
Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Concrete individuals are not constituents of the contents of the latter. Meinong supposed intenciobalidad objects like Zeus, the fountain of youth, Sherlock Holmes, etc. Fred Dretske has argued that the intentionality of many of an individual’s beliefs and desires results from an ontogenetic non-intentional process of selective learning. On their view, the intentional idiom fails to describe or explain any real phenomenon.
Many of an individual’s psychological states with intentionality e. The issue relevant to intentionality arises from the conflict between externalism and the locality assumption according to which causal processes are local processes.
Both questions are currently topics of much discussion in the philosophy of mind. So whereas the first belief report is true, the second belief report is false:. For supporting arguments, see Dretske Edit intenciona,idad record Mark as duplicate Export ibtencionalidad Find it on Scholar Request removal from index Translate to english Revision history.
In fact, Brentano held that intentionality is the hallmark of the mental: If there was nothing it is like to believe that 5 is a prime number, then, according to the view that phenomenal consciousness is the criterion of the mental, many propositional attitudes would fail to qualify as genuine mental states. This extension plays a crucial role in the externalist view of intentional mental states about which see section On the one hand, it is difficult to generate the strong intentionality of mental states from the information-theoretic account of the weak intentionality of non-mental things.
Before examining various contradictory answers to these questions, a preliminary question is relevant. The Ancient Greeks worshiped something. Secondly, if 13a – 15a are indeed false, as Russell’s view would have it, then one cannot validly infer 13b – 15brespectively, from their brentaon premisses.
I shall illustrate two distinct proposals for implementing this common goal. Unlike assertions, orders have a world-to-word direction of fit.
Among philosophers attracted to a physicalist ontology, few have accepted the outright eliminativist materialist denial of the reality of beliefs and desires. A third clarification has been Ned Block’s distinction between access consciousness or A-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness or P-consciousness.
Thus, the content of Oscar’s thought is different from the content of Twoscar’s thought. Many intencioalidad do not accept Brentano’s third thesis that intentionality is the mark of all mental states. What matters to the non-linguistic state reported are the properties of the linguistic report. First 13a – 15a would appear to express truths.
La doctrina de la intencionalidad en Franz Brentano
Of course, from then on, unlike Oscar on Earth and his twin on Twin-Earth, Otto and twin-Otto will not be behavioral twins: Another related puzzle is the puzzle of how identity statements can both be true and informative. Is intensionality a criterion of intentionality? Sobre la intencionalidad secundaria de las emociones.
To achieve this goal, two concepts have been central to Husserl’s internalist interpretation of intentionality: According to the second thesis, it is characteristic of the objects towards which the mind is directed by virtue of intentionality that they have the property which Brentano calls intentional inexistence.
According to Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, what matters to the identity of a thought about a concrete individual is not the individual thought about but the abstract sense by means of which he is thought about.
This article has no associated intencionalkdad. Modalidades de la intencionalidad cognoscitiva.
If seeing is intentional, then not all reports of intentionality are intensional. When the internal state has intentionality, the individual’s behavior is intentional. Singular thoughts about concrete perceptible objects may seem simpler and more primitive than either general ones or thoughts about abstract entities.
It is not entirely fixed by the internal physical and functional state of the individual’s brain. For further discussion, see the SEP entry on teleological theories of mental content and the papers collected in Ryder, Kinsbury and Williford eds.
Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer – no Kindle device required. For further discussion, see the entry on reference. Since Otto’s notebook has played the same functional role as Inga’s biological memory in generating their respective intencionaljdad and in accounting for their respective action, the conclusion is that the vehicles of an individual’s beliefs can be located outside the individual’s skull.
Nor can existential brentabo always be validly applied to sentences reporting beliefs, since from the fact that John believes that angels have wings, it does not follow that there are things such that John believes of them that they have wings.
One is the assumption that the mystery of the intentional relation should be elucidated against the background of non-intentional relations.